By Prof.  Vesselin POPOVSKI, Vice Dean of the Law School & Executive Director of the Centre for UN Studies O.P. Jindal Global University, India

Syria is not the only example where initially a ‘grievance-based’ internal conflict has gradually mutated into a ‘greed-based’ international conflict. The UN faced a variety of situations characterized by complexity, non-linearity and unpredictability, nevertheless it kept issuing template-based mandates, not tailored to domestic specifics. Usually when a situation deteriorates the UN simply increases the number of troops or adds more tasks to existing mandates. Such linear logic does not fit well with the dynamics of complex situations.

In 2000 an international panel led by Lakhdar Brahimi assessed in-depth the strengths and weaknesses of the UN peacekeeping operations and issued a report warning against deploying insufficient forces, which would ‘first raise and then dash the hopes’ of peace. One year ago, on 16 June 2015 an High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) issued a report suggesting ‘an initial mandate with an overall political goal, a limited number of initial priority tasks and an explicit planning mandate’, followed by a Secretary General’s (SG) proposal for sequenced activities and achievable performance benchmarks. Having an initial presence helps and allows good time for consultations with all parties for detailed assessment of assets, partnerships, capabilities and resources, as well as informal interactive discussions with troop contributors and the Secretariat.

Over the years some mandates of the UN Security Council have become lengthier: Res. 2227 on DR Congo lists over 20 tasks for the UN Mission (MONUSCO) on 15 pages, Res. 2274 on Afghanistan mandates over 10 tasks for UNAMA on 20 pages. Although the complexities with country situations are understandable, one caution is that when new tasks are constantly added, the context around the original ones also changes, for example the security umbrella may need strengthening or the conditions for transition and exit may change. There is a hope that the new SG and DPKO will prioritize force generation and deployment and there won’t be frustrating delays, as experienced in South Sudan (UNMISS) and Mali (MINUSMA). The UN was most impactful when it issued clear and sequenced mandates. The sequencing and prioritization, proposed by the HIPPO and the Security Council’s Presidential Statement from 25 November has been already attempted in the CAR and Mali.

The HIPPO emphasized primacy of politics as a first shift, inviting the Security Council to bring its collective leverage for the political solution. One lesson from the past is that the collective leverage has to be exercised throughout the life span of the missions, not only when mandates come up for renewal. The second shift by the HIPPO – use of the full spectrum – is also relevant in a volatile and dynamic situation, where a broad range of options should be open: sending special envoys, raising concerns if the humanitarian or political situation deteriorates and imposing sanctions. The HIPPO third shift – partnerships with regional organizations – is less relevant in Syria, but the Council should be informed of the positions of the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and study the UN experience in tailored partnerships with the African Union and other regional organizations, addressing critical situations in Africa in the last decade. The fourth shift – people-centered peace operations – helps to translate statements into actions. Field missions during the crisis in Timor Leste helped to ‘breathe life into the words’ (Brahimi) and such res, ne verba (deeds, not words) approach is worth – as in Mali and South Sudan – if the political process lacks traction.

The HIPPO report made useful recommendations on improving planning, streamlining financing, accountability and cost-efficiency, recruitment in top positions. But also it produced too long sections with a lot of déjà vu on prevention, on the three peacekeeping principles and the use of force. The HIPPO report fudged the relationship between peace operations and counter-terrorism[1] and how to separate the two in Syria will be a challenge. What the Security Council can do is to continue its admirable thematic work on counter-terrorism and try to apply this to country-specific decision-making, encouraging intelligence sharing, analysis and opening up communication spaces that until now have been disconnected.

The UN problems with administering elections in the past are well known and should not be repeated. When held too early elections can be divisive, increase tensions and lead to violence. Transitional power sharing might be preferable until the political weather clarifies and the state institutions stabilize.

Syria needs international presence with a long-term vision, creating trust, ensuring human security and incentivizing actors to work together. Syria also needs a reconstruction plan, starting with the most damaged cities and communities, based on a detailed and proper technical assessment of current physical infrastructure, human capacities and needs, coordinated not only with the government, but also with mayors and communities. One mistake in Iraq (non-related to UN) was dismantling the state instead of the regime. State-owned enterprises should remain, allowing the transitional government to retain control of the industry and support fuel and agricultural subsidies to sustain these important sectors. This will help to maintain stability, retain jobs, encourage Syrian talented civil servants and business class—still displaced—to return home. Reconstruction through locally elected governing councils would also ensure sustainability. Significant support should go for the already active women’s movement to restore the reproductive health services, education, economic opportunities, political participation. By empowering women the international presence in Syria can become a model of realization of Resolution 1325.

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[1] To be fair, there cannot be much of a new argument on this, the late Yitzhak Rabin said it all: ‘Make peace, as if there is no terror. Fight terror, as if there is no peace (process)’.