Архив за етикет: South East Europe

Is a Balkan Federation still in?

The fall of the Berlin wall recarnated by new fences of Macedonia and Bulgaria to desperately revived  traditional buffering zone , between  desecularized  Oxident and most uncertain Orient, looks as desolate as never before.

 

By Prof. Dr.sc. Plamen K. GEORGIEV

The Philsophical club, BG

Heildeberg alumni

The Western Balkans stumbled in a most boring and prolonged EU procedure of accession, slide on the EU generosity of leased souverignity. Which make local elites as a Bulgarian sociologist defined legitime up to Kalotino. * Border check pass control of Bulgaria to Serbia.

NATO seems bound to rather unrealistic strategies of  presence in the region, concentrated in a sophisticated Med Balkans strategy *water- sea presence that may turn the Black sea into fluid of geopolitical turmoils ending into sequential national catastrophes *1912, 1913, 1918, 1944.

While Russia relies on over 1000 years of cultural interweaving with what is still defined as its Orthodox sphere of  influence – the West (not represented by its most realistic visions of the peripheral  European nexus) is bidding on rising entropy of risks. The imperial investments of Russia from 1878 up to Stalin’s era of sharing the Balkans as designed in national contours  on a cigarette box  – in Yalta –  survived some how the Malta deal of Gorbi and Busch.

This provisional divison as many admit has much failed the EU process of accession moreover convincing integrity. Europe of 2 and even 3 speeds peeps behind the corner of friendly dimplomatic gatherings, usually ending with general agreements and less pragmatic results.

Menwhile elites on this side  – regarding post war traumatized Belgrade, a nationalist spilled Skopje earnest petty Balkan countries pro- Brussels aspirations, vigilant Orban’s  Budapest,  not to mention self – self teasing Bucharest  –  may have shaped a cluster of new gravity and potential cleavage, as way out of the new challenges and uncertainty offered by Great powers.

The latter usually have determined the geopolitical configuration of the region.

One point to add to the present perplexities is that The Balkans, seem tempted in their own way by  the experience of Grexit and the forthcoming  Brexit *. No matter of its outcome* the inevitable reconfiguration of Old Europe prompts to desperate search of alternatives.

The Eurasian one – as offered by Russia and its closer satellites of the Asian periphery may look less culturally relevant, but in a way a safety belt to sinking segments of the transitional elites. The need of finance and even military backing, as source of locally and EU disputed legitimacy may be a driving force to some new euro skepticism on this side.

The idea of returning to a new old niche of a Balkan federal dream may look as extravagant and unrealistic; still it is living in some heads around.

The latter deprived by Communist International, but suffered in its own way beyond borders of ethnic and quasi nationalist divisions may turn a real challenge as EU is in rather desperate search of new EU configuration.

Turkey seems less likely to survive on its Ottoman old notion of wider global presence. It is more likely that the 90 millions young nation will return to its pan Turk idea as admixture of revived totalitarism in a way recarnating Attaturk’s visions.  But stay as Western as it may swap for the role of chef of the Balkans opened to the Middle East.

No matter the outcome of British vote, the Balkans – once labeled ” villans at both sides of the Danube river “( Churchill), look less open to Brussels and the big powers. Step by step a new sense of Balkan identity – denied by think tanks from Regensburg, or even Moscow admit the need of some lose paternalism for the region as guarantee of piece and stability.

As disputable as civic culture grass rooting among oligarchs Balkan realities, the middle class on this side is still reluctantly motivated to reforms and westernization . But not so much in the bureaucratic,  “cash and carry” selective approach of Brussels.

The weight of what some still recognize as symbolic capital – has still value and is even used to rediscover own national experience of how to deal with hindernesses to freedom.

One good step towards the idea of a new Balkan federation may be the return to clusters of non-allies bound countries – an experience Yosef Broz Tito, successfully exploited even in the most sinister years of communism.

George Dimitroff’s (Leipzig 1933 hero of the Comintern) model of Macedonian – Bulgarian unity, or bipolar junction of relative common ethnic communities looks less realistic.

The failure of Rambujeu * the Yugoslav war, moreover the missed chance of cantonization of regions of Rest Yugoslavia , have clearly shown that a split ballot applied to ethic and religious quasi – constitutional settings on this side has no future.

The Balkans have a deeply rooted culture of mental similarities and experience of coping with othernesss. This may may turn to be the key for the modernization of the region moreover the stability of distressed Europe.

“Let the people go” ,as the old refrain says.  It may  come cheaper and even go smoother.

 

16.06. 2016

Sofia

Prof. Dr.sc.Plamen K. Georgiev  graduated sociology at Humboldt University, Berlin. He is guest lecturer of the University  of Heidelberg and Freiburg, Fellow of DAAD ; Member of the Union of  Bulgarian Scientists. Author of “The Bulgarian Political Culture“, V&Runipress, Göttingen, 2007; „Corruptive Patterns of Patronage in SE Europe“, 2008, Springer VS, “ Self Orientalization in SE Europe“, Springer VS, 2012 and others.  Adjunct professor at Center for Risk Assessment and Security Studies, New Bulgarian university, Sofia and columnist for independent European media

The Geopolitical fight over the Southern Corridor – Putin’s visit to Athens

 

 

Russia successfully undermined Nabucco and other Western attempts to secure alternative supplies and routes for natural gas to countries in South and Eastern Europe, leaving them defenseless against Russian energy blackmail. The fact of life is that today Bulgaria has returned to 100 percent dependence on Gazprom for its gas supplies, whereas six years ago, it was less than 90%.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras

The story seemed boring in its closed-cycle routine.

Until TANAP and TAP came into the play and Greece started calculating substantial revenues from transit fees.

Soured relations with Turkey deprived Moscow of a key lever in implementing its original triad strategy of preempting competitors from acceding to the EU gas market — at source; at critical infrastructure transit and entry points; and at destination end user point — CEE and SE markets.

At source, we are witnessing a variation of policies from open intimidation to enticement and charming offensives. In the early days of the Nabucco versus TAP competition, Gazprom resorted to open blackmail, threatening to destabilize President Aliev and support his opposition.

The Kremlin also profited and used overriding strategic interests of an international energy major in its deal with Rosneft to secure much needed liquidity to cover shortfalls gaping in its balance sheets after the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.

Once TAP was picked over Nabucco, thus cutting off Central Europe from access to alternative Azeri gas supplies, Russia turned to blowing hot and cold offering to buy substantial chunks of Azeri gas in the hope of reducing remaining flows for export to Europe via the Southern Corridor. Baku instead offered to buy Russian gas for internal consumption to release greater volumes of locally produced gas for export. The Kremlin spared no time and effort to erode the credibility of transit options for Caspian sourced gas through Georgia and most recently enjoyed speculating on the impact of instability in Turkey on future gas transit.

Yet TANAP started on time and works are in full swing.

Terrorist attacks on critical gas transport infrastructure in Turkey are no rarity these days, notably in regions dominated by Kurds or prone to Islamic State retaliatory strikes against the regime in Ankara.

Major gas discoveries in the East Mediterranean have further widened Gazprom’s defense lines trying to preempt competitors from entering South East and Central European gas markets.

The situation has become untenable with Greece taking center stage as a key factor in the counter offensive contemplated in think tanks in Moscow. At least that is what was the game plan.

Concerns over a fully fledged gas war with the West over South and Central Europe’s gas market are believed to have played an instrumental role in substantiating the rationale for Russia’s Syrian military operation and building up its permanent military presence – a naval and an air base. These new military assets should, at least in theory, enable the Kremlin to monitor and, where possible, to impede access of gas produced in the East Med gas fields to Turkey and onwards to Europe. Russian control over the Syrian economic zone comes into mind whenever considering transit routes to Turkey for East Med gas.

The start of construction on TANAP and TAP forced the Kremlin to act in earnest and stir up a blend of real and virtual policy actions in Greece and Italy. In spite of all the media frenzy and speculation that Putin will buy cheap access to Greek transport infrastructure and key gas transport infrastructure, including the LNG terminal at Alexandroupolis and the subsea infrastructure in the Adriatic or Ionian Seas, he recognizes the limits of his financial and political powers to turn tides in modern European politics.

Yet he can still inflict considerable damage and make regional politicians account for his words and actions.

While the Kremlin top man is unable to deliver on his promises — Russia can no longer offer financial red carpets — as a master of brinkmanship diplomacy he still has some strong cards to play and stir trouble within the European Union, undermining key pillars of its energy security policies.

The Russian President’s words could potentially fall on listening ears in Greece and Italy, notably of politically attuned businessmen that would like to additionally load up the capacity of the TAP, revive the Poseidon project (or the talk of it) and most importantly control Greek LNG regasification terminals, thus denying access of U.S. sourced seaborne shale gas to the SEE and CEE gas market.

The media hype around a new edition of South Stream could further strain relations in the EU, offering transit countries fresh, yet false hopes that they would be able to enter the end spiel with fresh strategic initiatives.

Putin’s visit to Greece reverberated across segments of Southeast Europe’s ruling elite close to Russia in at least two ways — it gave public prominence to Kremlin’s favorite EU themes with sanctions lifting and soliciting maximum support for Gazprom’s business interest and market shares topping the agenda.

Even if nothing else comes out at the end — Bulgarian and other regional Russia sympathizers will find it tempting to translate loyalty to Kremlin into votes, that could, at least in theory, further dilute diversification drives and ultimately slow down and even block competitive Caspian, Middle Eastern, Eastern Mediterranean and LNG flows into CEE.

Gazprom will be able to saturate the markets of the Southern Corridor with sufficient volumes of gas at competitive prices before diversification has ever happened, benefiting from privileged sales and transit contracts sealed with intergovernmental agreements raising the cost of entry for new competitors.

Some might associate President Plevneliev’s decision not to stand up for new elections after his party GERB shied away from supporting him with some subtle maneuvers of the old energy Grand Slam coalition.

The Russian president knows pretty well that the notion of an EU destined South Stream-2 project from politically contentious Crimea would kill any chance of substantial debate. Yet he might persist in exploring and exploiting every new area of vulnerability in the energy defense shield of South East Europe and the EU in general.

Gazprom would not miss the chance to play the tune of privileged relations with its main Greek partner the Copelouzos Group, when considering the potential to control the FSRU in Alexandroupolis and make access for U.S. or other LNG gas to the Southern Corridor more difficult. The same applies to the potential of using the IGB in reverse mode for Russian gas via South Stream–2 to access the TAP.

Geopolitics were expected to come to the fore during Putin’s trip to Athens in his Favorite adage of charming and dividing EU members. Yet he had to face a new reality – even closest allies like Tsipras are unable to defy economic and political gravity and the reality of a waning Russia.

The Russian President seemed to have nothing to offer and received nothing in return.

Source: bulgariaanalytica.org, May 31, 2016

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